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ABSTRACT
We study how to reach a Nash equilibrium in a load balanc-
ing scenario where each task is managed by a selfish agent
and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize
its cost. The cost of a machine is a function of the load on
it. The load on a machine is the sum of the weights of the
jobs running on it. We prove that Nash equilibria can be
learned on that games with incomplete information, using
some Lyapunov techniques.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider in this paper a now classical settings for self-
ish load balancing, where some dynamical aspects are intro-
duced. We consider tasks or jobs (players) whose objective
is to minimize their own cost. Such games are sometimes
called the KP model [21, 28]. We consider a particular learn-
ing scenario for tasks in this game that we prove to converge
to Nash equilibria of the game. Our learning algorithm, al-
ready considered in [26] for general games, is proved to be
convergent on these allocation games, through some Lya-
punov function.
The settings is the following [21, 28]: weighted tasks or jobs
(players) shall be assigned to a set of machines having dif-
ferent speeds so that tasks try to minimize their own cost.
Their cost under an assignment A depends on the load of
that machine. The load on a machine under A is the sum of
the weights of the jobs running on it. We consider a system
in which jobs are unsplittable so that a player’s entire job
will go to a machine accordingly to this player’s probability
vector.
More formally, we consider a set of n independent tasks
(players) with weight w1, . . . , wn respectively. We assume
the weights to be positive integers. These tasks are to be
associated with E, a set ofm resources (machines). Let [n] =
{1, · · · , n} denote the set of tasks and [m] = {1, · · · ,m} the
set of machines.
An assignment A : [n] → [m] specifies for each task i, the
machine on which it runs: each task i selects exactly one
machine A[i] (also denoted by ai by abuse of notation).
The load λℓ of machine ℓ under the assignment A is the
the sum of the weights of the tasks running on it: λℓ =P
i:ai=ℓ
wi. The cost of machine ℓ corresponds to its fin-
ish time, i.e is a function depending on its load denoted
by Cℓ(λℓ). The cost of task i under the assignment A cor-
responds to the cost on machine ai, i.e., its cost is ci =
Cai(λai).
We will focus in this paper on linear (affine) cost functions:
Cℓ(λ) = αℓλ+ βℓ, with αℓ, βℓ ≥ 0. This is sometimes called
the uniformly related machine case [28].
We assume from now that all costs are not greater than 1.
This is without loss of generality, since dividing all costs by
some big enough constant in what follows preserve dynamics.
We assume that tasks (players) migrate selfishly without any
centralized control and only have a local view of the system.
All of the tasks know how many resources (machines) are
available. At each elementary step t + 1, they know their
current cost and the machine they chose at step t. We study
how to reach a (mixed) Nash equilibrium in this load bal-
ancing scenario. Each agent i selects a machine (at each
time step or instance of the repeated game) using a mixed
strategy qi(t) at step t, with qi,ℓ(t) denoting the probability
for agent i to select machine ℓ at step t.
We are interested in building distributed learning algorithms
for tasks so that (qi(t))i∈[n] converges towards some (possi-
bly mixed) Nash equilibrium of the system.
Notice that such games are known to always admit at least
one pure Nash equilibrium: see [15, 9] for a proof. At least
one of them is a global optimal.
2. RELATED WORK
The allocation problems that we consider in this paper can
also be formally defined as a routing problem between two
nodes connected by parallel edges with possibly different
speeds. Each agent as an amount of traffic to map to one of
the edges such as the load on this edge is as small as possible
[21, 28].
Price of anarchy, introduced by [21], comparing cost of Nash
equilibria to cost of the optimal (social cost) has been inten-
sively studied on these games: see e.g. [28] for a reference
introduction.
Similar games but with more general cost functions have also
been considered: see e.g. [28, 4, 7, 23], and all references in
[28]. Refer to [8, 12, 22] for surveys about results for selfish
load balancing and selfish routing on parallel links.
There are a few works considering dynamic versions of these
allocation games, where agents try to learn Nash equilibria,
in the spirit of this paper.
First, notice that the proof of existence of a pure Nash equi-
libria can be turned into a dynamic: players play in turn,
and move to machines with a lower load. Such a strategy can
be proved to lead to a pure Nash equilibrium. Bounds on
the convergence time have been investigated in [9, 10]. Con-
sidered algorithms are centralized and require complete in-
formation games. Obtained bounds are mostly obtained by
bounding the possible variations of suitable potential func-
tions. Since players play in turns, this is often called the
Elementary Step System. Other results of convergence in
this model, have been investigated in [16, 23, 25].
Concerning models that allow concurrent redecisions, we can
mention the followings works. In [11], tasks are allowed
in parallel to migrate from overloaded to underloaded re-
sources. The process is proved to terminate in expected
O(log logn+logm) rounds. The analysis is restricted to the
case of unitary weights, and with identical machines. The
considered process requires a global knowledge: one must
determine whether ones load is above or under average.
A Stochastic version of best-response dynamic avoiding that
latter problem has been investigated in [2]. It is proved
to terminate in expected O(log logn +m4) rounds for uni-
form tasks, and uniform machines. This has been extended
to weighted tasks and uniform machines in [3]. The ex-
pected time of convergence to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium is in
O(nmW 3ǫ−2) whereW denotes the maximum weight of any
task.
The dynamic considered in this paper has been studied in
[26] for general stochastic games. It is proved in [26] that this
dynamic is weakly convergent to some function solution of
an ordinary differential equation. This ordinary differential
equation turns out to be a replicator equation. A sufficient
condition for convergence is proved. No Lyapunov function
is established for systems similar to the ones considered in
this paper there.
Replicator equations have been deeply studied in evolution-
ary game theory [19, 29]. Evolutionary game theory doesn’t
restrict to these dynamics, but considers a whole family of
dynamics that satisfy folk theorems in the spirit of Theorem
1.
Bounds on the rate of convergence of fictious play dynamics
have been established in [17], and in [20] for the best re-
sponse dynamic. Fictious play has been reproved to be con-
vergent for zero-sum games using numerical analysis meth-
ods, or more generally stochastic approximation theory: fic-
tious play can be proved to be a Euler discretization of a
certain continuous time process [19].
Evolutionary game theory has been applied to routing prob-
lems in the Wardrop traffic model in [14, 13].
A replicator equation for the allocation games considered
in this paper has been considered in [1], where a Lyapunov
function is established. The dynamics considered in [1] is not
the same as us: we have a replicator dynamic where fitnesses
are given by true costs, whereas, [1] considers marginal costs.
In [5, 6], the replicator dynamics for particular allocation
games have been proved to converge to a pure Nash equilib-
rium by modifying game costs in order to obtain Lyapunov
functions. It has also been proved that only pure Nash equi-
libria can be learned.
3. GAME THEORETIC SETTINGS
Each one of the n players (tasks) has the same finite set of
actions (machines) E, of cardinality m: machines are known
by and available to all of the players. An element of E, i.e.
of [m], is called a pure strategy.
Define functions di :
Qn
j=1 E → [0, 1], 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by:
di(a1, a2, · · · , an) = ci(j plays strategy aj ∈ E, 1 ≤ j ≤ n)
(1)
where (a1, · · · , an) is the set of pure strategies played by the
player team.
In our case, di(a1, a2, · · · , an) = Cai(
P
j:aj=ai
wj).
We call it the payoff function, or utility function of player i
and the objective of each player is to minimize his payoff.
We assume without loss of generality in this paper that pay-
offs stay in [0, 1]. It this doesn’t hold, an affine transforma-
tion on payoffs yields this property.
As usual, we want to extend the payoff function to mixed
strategies. To do so, let S denote the simplex of dimension
m: S is the set of m-dimensional probability vectors:
S = {q = (q1, · · · , qm) ∈ [0, 1]
m :
mX
ℓ=1
qℓ = 1}.
An element of S is called a mixed strategy for a player.
Let K = Sn be the space of mixed strategies.
Payoff functions di defined on pure strategies in equation
(1) can be extended to functions di on the space of mixed
strategies K as follows:
di(q1, ..., qn) = E[ci|1 ≤ j ≤ n plays mixed strategy qj ]
=
P
j1,··· ,jn
di(j1, · · · , jn)×
Qn
s=1 qs,js
(2)
where (q1, · · · , qn) is the set of mixed strategies played by
the player team and qj,ℓ denotes the probability for player j
to play strategy ℓ.
Definition 1. The n-tuple of mixed strategies (q˜1, · · · , q˜n)
is said to be a Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies), if for
each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have: di(q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, q˜i, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n) ≤
di(q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, q, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n), for all q ∈ S.
It is well known that every n-person game has at least one
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies [24].
Let K∗ be defined by K∗ = (S∗)n, where S∗ = {q ∈ S| q
is a m-dimensional probability vector with one component
unity}. In other words, the set K∗ denotes the corners of
simplex K.
Clearly, K∗ is one to one correspondence with pure strate-
gies, i.e. with
Qn
j=1 E: any pure strategy ℓ corresponds to
unit vector eℓ, with ℓ
th component unity.
Definition 2. The n-tuple of actions (a˜1, · · · , a˜n) (or
equivalently the set of strategies (ea˜1 , · · · , ea˜n)) is called a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
di(a˜1, · · · , a˜i−1, a˜i, a˜i+1, · · · , a˜n) ≤ di(a˜1, · · · , a˜i−1, ai, a˜i+1,
· · · , a˜n), for all ai ∈ S
∗.
Unlike general games, the allocation games considered in
this paper always admit Nash equilibria in pure strategies
[15, 9].
Now the learning problem for the game can be stated as fol-
lows: Assume that the game repeats at time k = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
At any instant k, let qi[k] be the strategy employed by
the ith player. Let ai[k] and ci[k] be the actual action se-
lected and the payoff received by player i respectively at
time k (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ). Find a decentralized learning al-
gorithm for the players, that is, design function Ti, where
qi[k + 1] = Ti(qi[k], ai[k], ci[k]) such that qi[k] → q˜i as
k → +∞ where (q˜1, · · · , q˜n) is a Nash equilibrium of the
game.
4. THE CONSIDERED RANDOMIZED DIS-
TRIBUTED ALGORITHM
We consider the following learning algorithm, already con-
sidered in [26].
Definition 3 (Considered Algorithm). 1. At ev-
ery time step, each task (player) chooses an action ac-
cording to his current strategy or Action Probability
Vector (APV). Thus, the ith player selects machine
ℓ = ai(k) at instant k with probability qi,ℓ(k).
2. Each player obtains a payoff based on the set of all
actions. The rewards to player i at time k is ci(k).
3. Each player updates his APV according to the rule:
qi(k+1) = qi(k)+b×(1−ci(k))×(eai(k)−qi(k)), (3)
where 0 < b < 1 is a parameter and eai(k) is a unit
vector of dimension m with ai(k)
th component unity.
Notice, that componentwise, Equation (3) can be rewritten:
qi,ℓ(k+1) =

qi,ℓ(k)− b(1− ci(k))qi,ℓ(k) if ai 6= l
qi,ℓ(k) + b(1− ci(k))(1− qi,ℓ(k)) if ai = l
(4)
Decisions made by players are completely decentralized, at
each time step, player i only needs ci and qi, respectively
her payoff and strategy, to update his APV.
Let Q[k] = (q1(k), · · · , qn(k)) ∈ K denote the state of the
player team at instant k. Our interest is in the asymp-
totic behavior of Q[k] and its convergence to a Nash Equi-
librium. Clearly, under the learning algorithm specified by
(3), {Q[k], k ≥ 0} is a Markov process.
Observe that this dynamic can also be put in the form
Q[k + 1] = Q[k] + b ·G(Q[k], a[k], c[k]), (5)
where a[k] = (a1(k), · · · , aN (k)) denotes the actions selected
by the player team at k and c[k] = (c1(k), · · · , cN (k)) their
resulting payoffs, for some function G(., ., .) representing the
updating specified by equation (3), that does not depend on
b.
Consider the piecewise-constant interpolation of Q[k], Qb(.),
defined by
Q
b(t) = Q[k], t ∈ [kb, (k + 1)b), (6)
where b is the parameter used in (3).
Qb(.) belongs to the space of all functions from R into K.
These functions are right continuous and have left hand lim-
its. Now consider the sequence {Qb(.) : b > 0}. We are
interested in the limit Q(.) of this sequence as b→ 0.
The following is proved in [26], and follows for example from
[27, theorem 11.2.3].
Proposition 1. The sequence of interpolated processes
{Qb(.)} converges weakly, as b → 0, to Q(.), which is the
(unique) solution of Cauchy problem
dQ
dt
= φ(Q), Q(0) = Q0 (7)
where Q0 = Q
b(0) = Q[0], and φ : K → K is given by
φ(Q) = E[G(Q[k], a[k], c[k])|Q[k] = Q],
where G is the function in Equation (5).
Recall that a family of random variable (Yt)t∈R weakly con-
verges to a random variable Y , if E[h(Xt)] converges to
E[h(Y )] for each bounded and continuous function h. As dis-
cussed in [26], weak convergence is admittedly a very weak
type of convergence.
The proof of Proposition 1 is based on weak-convergence
methods, non-constructive in several aspects (mainly relies
on existence of limit sequences in some functional spaces),
and does not provide error bounds.
Using (4), we can rewrite E[G(Q[k], a[k], c[k])] in the general
case as follows.
E[G(Q[k], a[k], c[k])]i,ℓ
= qi,ℓ(1− qi,ℓ)(1− E[ci|Q(k), ai = ℓ])
−
P
ℓ′ 6=ℓ qi,ℓ′qi,ℓ(1− E[ci|Q(k), ai = ℓ
′])
= qi,ℓ[
P
ℓ′ 6=ℓ qi,ℓ′(1− E[ci|Q(k), ai = ℓ])
−
P
ℓ′ 6=ℓ qi,ℓ′(1− E[ci|Q(k), ai = ℓ
′]]
= −qi,ℓ
P
ℓ′(E[ci|Q(k), ai = ℓ]− qi,ℓ′E[ci|Q(k), ai = ℓ
′]),
(8)
using the fact that 1− qi,ℓ =
P
ℓ′ 6=ℓ qi,ℓ′ .
Let hi,ℓ be the expectation of the payoff for i if player i plays
pure strategy ℓ, and players j 6= i play (mixed) strategy qj .
Formally,
hi,ℓ(q1, · · · , qi−1, qi+1, · · · , qn) = E[ci|Q(k), ai = ℓ].
Let hi(Q) the mean value of hi,ℓ, in the sense that
hi(Q) =
X
ℓ′
qi,ℓ′hi,ℓ′(Q).
We obtain from (8),
E[G(Q[k], a[k], c[k])]i,ℓ = −qi,ℓ(hi,ℓ − hi(Q)).
Hence, the dynamics given by Ordinary Differential Equa-
tion (7) is componentwise:
dqi,ℓ
dt
= −qi,ℓ(hi,ℓ − hi(Q)). (9)
This is a (multi-population) replicator equation, that is to
say a well known and studied dynamics in evolutionary game
theory [19, 29]. In that context, hi,ℓ is interpreted as a fitness
of a given game, and hi(Q) is the mean value of hi,ℓ in the
above sense.
In particular, solutions are known to satisfy the following
theorem (an instance of the so-called evolutionary game the-
ory’s folk theorems) [19].
Theorem 1 (see e.g. [19]). The following are true for
the solutions of replicator equation (9):
• All Nash equilibria are stationary points.
• All strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable.
• All stable stationary points are Nash equilibria.
Hence, stable stationary points correspond to Nash equilib-
ria.
However, unstable stationary points can exist. Actually, all
corners of simplex K are stationary points, as well as, from
the form of (9), more generally any state Q in which all
strategies in its support perform equally well. Such a state
Q is not a Nash equilibrium as soon as there is an unused
strategy (i.e. outside of the support) that performs better.
As limit points of a dynamic correspond to stationary points,
from this theorem, we can conclude that the dynamics (9),
and hence the learning algorithm when b goes to 0, will have
stable limit points that correspond to Nash equilibria.
However, for general games, there is no convergence in the
general case.
We will now show that for our allocation games, there is
always convergence. It will then follow from previous dis-
cussions that our considered learning algorithm converges
towards Nash equilibria, i.e. solves the learning problem for
allocation games.
First, we specialize the dynamics for allocation games. Here,
we have
ci = Cai(λai)
= αaiwi + αai
P
j 6=i:aj=ai
wj + βai
= αaiwi + αai
P
j 6=i 1aj=aiwj + βai
where 1aj=ai is 1 whenever aj = ai, 0 otherwise.
Taking expectations, using E[1aj=ai ] = qj,ai , we get
E[ci] = αaiwi + βai + αai
X
j 6=i
qj,aiwj ,
and
hi,ℓ = αℓwi + βℓ + αℓ
X
j 6=i
qj,ℓwj .
We claim the following.
Theorem 2 (Extension of Theorem 3.3 from [26]).
Suppose there is a non-negative function
F : K → R
such that for some constants wi > 0, for all i, ℓ, Q,
∂F
∂qi,ℓ
(Q) = wi × hi,ℓ(Q). (10)
Then, for any initial condition, the algorithm will converge
to a stationary point.
Proof. We claim that F (.) is a Liapunov function of the
dynamic, i.e. that F is monotone along trajectories.
Indeed,
dF (Q(t))
dt
=
P
i,ℓ
∂F
∂qi,ℓ
dqi,ℓ
dt
= −
P
i,ℓ
∂F
∂qi,ℓ
(Q)qi,ℓ
P
ℓ′ qi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)− hi,ℓ′(Q)]
= −
P
i,ℓ wihi,ℓ(Q)qi,ℓ
P
ℓ′ qi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)− hi,ℓ′(Q)]
= −
P
i wi
P
ℓ
P
ℓ′ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ(Q)hi,ℓ′(Q)]
= −
P
i wi
P
ℓ
P
ℓ′>ℓ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)− hi,ℓ′(Q)]
2
≤ 0
(11)
In above formula, we used the following fact:
Lemma 1.P
ℓ
P
ℓ′ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ(Q)hi,ℓ′(Q)]
=
P
ℓ
P
ℓ′>ℓ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)− hi,ℓ′(Q)]
2
Proof. Indeed, we haveP
ℓ
P
ℓ′ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ(Q)hi,ℓ′(Q)]
=
P
ℓ
P
ℓ′>ℓ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ(Q)hi,ℓ′(Q)]
+
P
ℓ
P
ℓ′<ℓ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ(Q)hi,ℓ′(Q)]
=
P
ℓ
P
ℓ′>ℓ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ(Q)hi,ℓ′(Q)]
+
P
ℓ′
P
ℓ′<ℓ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ(Q)hi,ℓ′(Q)]
(by permuting indices)
=
P
ℓ
P
ℓ′>ℓ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ(Q)hi,ℓ′(Q)]
+
P
ℓ
P
ℓ<ℓ′ qi,ℓ′qi,ℓ[hi,ℓ′(Q)
2 − hi,ℓ′(Q)hi,ℓ(Q)]
(by changing notation of indices)
=
P
ℓ
P
ℓ′>ℓ qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)− hi,ℓ′(Q)]
2
This is clear that a replicator equation dynamic preserves
simplex K, and hence that trajectories stay in compact set
K.
From Liapunov Stability theorem ([18] page 194), asymp-
totically all trajectories will be in the set K′ = {Q∗ ∈ K :
dF (Q∗)
dt
= 0}.
Now, from (11), we know that dF (Q
∗)
dt
= 0 implies
qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)− hi,ℓ′(Q)] = 0
for all i, ℓ, ℓ′, hence that Q∗ is a stationary point of the
dynamic.
A solution of Dynamic (9) that starts from some stationary
points (i.e. for example a corner of K) will clearly stay
invariant. Such a starting point can be unstable.
There may also exist some unstable solutions of Dynamic
(9): Consider for example a dynamic that stays on some
face ofK where some well-performing strategy is never used.
However, such trajectories are extremly unstable: We may
expect the underlying stochastic learning algorithm to leave
such face almost-surely.
In other words, unless a trajectory is started from some un-
stable corner of K, we may expect its limit points to be
stable stationary points.
From Theorem 1, stable stationary points are precisely Nash
equilibria. Hence, if the stochastic algorithm is not started
from a corner, if a function satisfying the hypotheses of The-
orem 2 can be found, the stochastic algorithm will converge
to a Nash equilibrium.
We claim that such a function always exists for our allocation
games. Notice that our dynamic is actually quite different
from the one considered in [1], for which another potential
function has been established: we have a replicator dynamic
where fitnesses are given by true costs, whereas, for some
reasons, [1] considers marginal costs. Hence, constructions
from [1] cannot be used directly.
Proposition 2. For allocation games considered in this
paper, the following function F satisfies the hypotheses of
previous theorem:
F (Q) =
mX
ℓ=1
"
βℓ
nX
j=1
qj,ℓwj +
αℓ
2
(
nX
j=1
qj,ℓwj)
2
+αℓ
nX
j=1
qj,ℓw
2
j (1−
qj,ℓ
2
)
#
Proof. We have
∂F
∂qi,ℓ′
(Q) = βℓ′wi + αℓ′(
Pn
j=1 qj,ℓ′wj)wi + αℓ′w
2
i − αℓ′qi,ℓ′w
2
i
= wi[βℓ′ + αℓ′(
Pn
j=1 qj,ℓ′wj) + αℓ′wi − αℓ′qi,ℓ′wi]
= wi[αℓ′wi + βℓ′ + αℓ′(
P
j 6=i qj,ℓ′wj)]
= wi × hi,ℓ(Q),
as requested.
Notice that the hypothesis of affine cost functions is crucial
here.
Proposition 3. Suppose for example that cost functions
were quadratic :
Cℓ(λ) = αℓλ
2 + βℓλℓ + γℓ,
with αℓ, βℓ, γℓ ≥ 0, αℓ 6= 0.
A function F of class C2 that satisfies (10) for all i, ℓ, Q,
and general choice of weights (wi)i can not exist.
Proof. By Schwartz theorem, we must have
∂
∂qi′,ℓ′
(
∂F
∂qi,ℓ
) =
∂
∂qi,ℓ
(
∂F
∂qi′,ℓ′
),
and hence
Wi
∂hi,ℓ
∂qi′,ℓ′
=Wi′
∂hi′,ℓ′
∂qi,ℓ
,
for all i, i′, ℓ, ℓ′, for some constants Wi,Wi′ . This is easy to
see that this doesn’t hold for general choice of Q and weights
(wi)i in that case.
Coming back to our model (affine costs), we obtain.
Theorem 3. For allocation games considered in this pa-
per, for any initial condition in K−K∗, the considered learn-
ing algorithm converges to a (mixed) Nash equilibrium.
We now discuss the time of convergence.
From the dynamics(9), this is clear that if qi,ℓ is 0 (respec-
tively 1) at time 0, it will stay null (1). Hence, if player i
starts with some strategy qi(0) at time 0, we know that at
any time t, its strategy qi(t) will have a support included in
the support of qi(0):
qi,ℓ(0) = 0⇒ qi,ℓ(t) = 0, ∀t ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
∀t ≥ 0, qi,ℓ(t) > 0⇒ qi,ℓ(0) > 0.
This motivates the following definitions:
Definition 4. Given a strategy q ∈ S, we write S(q) ⊂ S
for the strategies q′ whose support is included in the support
of q: i.e. such that
q
′
i,ℓ > 0⇒ qi,ℓ > 0.
Definition 5. The n-tuple of mixed strategies (q˜1, · · · , q˜n)
is said to be a relative ǫ-Nash equilibrium, if for each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have: di(q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, q˜i, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n) ≤
di(q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, q, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n) + ǫ, forall q ∈ S(q˜i).
In other words, a n-tuple of mixed strategies (q˜1, · · · , q˜n)
is not a relative ǫ-Nash equilibrium, if there exists some i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and some q ∈ S(q˜i) with
di(q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, q, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n)
< di(q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, q˜i, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n)− ǫ.
Clearly, if there exists such an i, and q ∈ S(q˜i), there must
exist some pure strategies ℓ, and ℓ′ in S(q˜i) with
di(q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, eℓ, q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n)
< di(q˜1, · · · , q˜i−1, eℓ′ , q˜i+1, · · · , q˜n)− ǫ,
that is to say, such that
hi,ℓ < hi,ℓ′ − ǫ,
and hence
[hi,ℓ(Q)− hi,ℓ′(Q)]
2 ≥ ǫ2.
Since we know from (11) that
dF (Q(t))
dt
= −
X
i
wi
X
ℓ
X
ℓ′>ℓ
qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ [hi,ℓ(Q)− hi,ℓ′(Q)]
2
,
which means that concerning a point Q(t) that is not a rel-
ative ǫ-Nash equilibrium, we know that
dF (Q(t))
dt
≤ − wiqi,ℓqi,ℓ′ǫ
2
for some i, ℓ, ℓ′.
Theorem 4. Let Q(0) be any initial condition in K−K∗.
Let
T ≤
F (Q(0))
(mini wi)ǫ2δ∗
.
Assume
δi(Q) = min
ℓ,ℓ′:qi,ℓqi,ℓ′ 6=0
qi,ℓqi,ℓ′
stay bounded by below for all i by some positive δ∗, on time
t ∈ [0, T ].
Then a relative ǫ-Nash equilibrium is reached by the dynamic
(9) at a time less than T .
Proof. We have
dF (Q(t))
dt
≤ −(min
i
wi)ǫ
2
δ
∗
,
whenever Q(t) is not a relative ǫ-Nash equilibrium. This
implies that
F (Q(t)) ≤ F (Q(0))− (min
i
wi)ǫ
2
δ
∗
t,
if Q(t) is not a relative ǫ-Nash equilibrium from time 0 to t.
Since F is non-negative, we get that a relative ǫ-Nash equi-
librium must be reached at a time T with
T ≤
F (Q(0))
(mini wi)ǫ2δ∗
,
which yields the theorem.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered a classical settings [21] for selfish
load balancing, but extended with some dynamical aspects.
We considered a learning algorithm proposed by [26]. We
proved that this learning algorithm learns mixed Nash equi-
libria of the game, extending several results of [26].
To do so, we proved that the learning algorithm is asymptot-
ically equivalent to an ordinary differential equation, which
turns out to be a replicator equation. Using a folk theo-
rem from evolutionary game theory, one knows that, if the
dynamics converges, it will be towards some Nash equilib-
ria. We proved using a Liapunov function argument that
the dynamics converges in our considered settings. We also
showed that it is actually possible to provide a general esti-
mation that one could call an epsilon convergence time for
any suitable starting condition.
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